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This paper assesses the impact of two recent policies designed to increase insurance coverage for older
teens and young adults.  The introduction of SCHIP in 1997 enabled low and moderate income teens
up to age 19 to gain access to public health insurance.  More recent policies adopted by a number of
states have enabled young adults between the ages of 19 and (typically) 24 to remain covered under
their parents’ health insurance.  We take advantage of the discrete break in coverage at age 19 to evaluate
the impact of SCHIP.  We also use quasi-experimental variation across states and years along with
the targeted nature of eligibility to evaluate the impact of these “extended parental coverage” laws.
Our results suggest that both types of policies were effective at increasing health insurance coverage,
especially among their respective target populations.  Overall, SCHIP increases insurance coverage
by 3 percentage points; those with incomes under 150 percent of poverty are found to experience a
7 percentage point increase.  We find little evidence of crowd-out associated with the introduction
of SCHIP.  Extended parental coverage laws have minimal aggregate effects on coverage, but they
increase coverage by up to 5 percentage points for select groups.  These laws may generate reverse
crowd-out, as individuals leave public insurance coverage to take advantage of the private coverage






















For the past 25 years, public policy regarding health insurance has focused on increasing 
the rate of coverage among children and youth in the United States.  As shown in Figure 1, these 
efforts have been quite successful, with insurance coverage rates among children under the age 
of 19 rising by roughly 15 percentage points between 1982 and 2007. In contrast, coverage rates 
among young adults (aged 19 to 29) remain as low as, and in some cases much lower than, they 
were 25 years ago.  Less than two-thirds of 23-year-olds are currently covered by health 
insurance.   Because of these relatively low rates of insurance coverage, young adults comprise a 
large fraction of all those without health insurance.  Indeed, one-third of all the uninsured in the 
U.S. fall into this young adult age group. 
As a result, public policy has increasingly focused on raising insurance coverage among 
young adults.  One option is to expand existing public insurance programs that are targeted at 
children and teens, such as Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP), by increasing the maximum age to qualify for coverage.  Children generally lose their 
Medicaid or SCHIP coverage on their 19
th birthday, but recent proposals have sought to increase 
this age limit to as high as 25 years old.
1  A second option is to expand private insurance 
coverage among young adults by increasing the age of dependency for the purposes of health 
insurance coverage.  Due to incentives of the tax code, children generally lose access to private 
insurance coverage through their parents at age 19 (or age 24 if they are full-time students).  
However, in recent years, several states have expanded eligibility to young adults through 
(typically) age 24 in certain population subgroups to be covered under their parents’ employer-
provided plan. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the Children’s Health First Act (H.R.1535  and S.895), introduced in March 2007 by  Rep. John 
Dingell and Sen. Hillary Clinton. 3 
This paper provides evidence on the efficacy of these two policy options to increase 
health insurance coverage among young adults.  While the existing literature has examined the 
take-up and crowd-out rates associated with SCHIP, it is unclear that these estimates are 
applicable to young adults.  We provide new estimates of take-up and crowd-out, which are more 
relevant to the young adult population, by taking advantage of the discontinuity in SCHIP 
eligibility upon turning age 19 that was generated when the program was instituted in the late 
1990s.  “Extended parental coverage” laws are recent enough that no past research of which we 
are aware has examined their effect on take-up and crowd-out.  We take advantage of variation 
across states and years in the introduction of these laws, along with other provisions that target 
certain population subgroups, to identify the effects of these extended parental coverage laws.  
Our estimates suggest that both policies have been successful in increasing insurance 
coverage for older teens and young adults, although the aggregate impact is larger for SCHIP.  
We find that SCHIP increased insurance coverage by three percentage points for older teens as a 
whole.  Those under 150 and 300 percent of the poverty line experienced a seven and four 
percentage point increase, respectively.  We also find weaker evidence of crowd-out than in the 
existing SCHIP literature.   
We also find that extended parental coverage laws are effective at increasing rates of 
insurance coverage for those groups targeted by the policy.  These groups include those whose 
parents have group health insurance coverage and who work in firms that are unlikely to be 
exempt from state insurance regulation due to ERISA.  For young adults in this subpopulation, 
coverage rates are found to rise by five percentage points, which corresponds to a 25 percent 
decline in uninsurance rates for this subpopulation.  In addition, we find that effects are 
concentrated among non-students, which is consistent with the fact that many students are 
eligible for parental coverage even in the absence of these state laws.   These laws are also found 4 
to have their largest effects in the income distribution on those between 150 and 300 percent of 
the poverty line.  These young adults experience a 2.7 percentage point increase in coverage in 
response to extended parental coverage laws.  Because the targeted groups are a subset of the full 
population of young adults, we are unable to find an impact of extended parental coverage laws 
on aggregate rates of insurance coverage.  Our results also provide evidence of reverse crowd 
out; increases in private insurance coverage may be at least partially offset by reductions in 
public insurance coverage.   
 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Legislative Background 
  While Medicaid policy in the 1980s and early 1990s dramatically expanded coverage for 
pregnant women, infants, and young children, coverage expanded relatively little for teenagers 
during this time.  Teenagers who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
were always covered by Medicaid, but the income eligibility limits for AFDC – and therefore 
Medicaid – coverage were extremely low in most states.  For example, income eligibility limits 
for 18-year-olds were 15 percent of the federal poverty line in Alabama, 28 percent in Florida, 41 
percent in New Jersey, 33 percent in Ohio, and 17 percent in Texas (Rosenbach, et al., 2003).  
The only substantial Medicaid expansion that affected teenagers was the provision of 
OBRA 1990 requiring that that all states provide Medicaid to children with incomes below the 
federal poverty line and birth dates after September 30, 1983 (U.S. Congress, 1994).  This 
change led to a gradual expansion of Medicaid eligibility to older children and teenagers.  For 
older teenagers, however, Medicaid eligibility remained extremely restrictive through 1997, 
when those born after September 30
th, 1983 were no more than age 14. 5 
This changed in 1997 upon the introduction of SCHIP, which was created by the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA 97) and enacted in August of that year.  This legislation 
provided federal matching funds for states to expand coverage up to age 19 and to children in 
families with income beyond previous Medicaid eligibility levels.  States could either expand 
their existing Medicaid programs or create new programs.  States launched their SCHIP 
programs at different times, but all did so within a fairly narrow window.  Most began enrolling 
children in 1998 and by the end of 1999 all SCHIP programs were up and running (Wooldridge, 
et al., 2003).  States were allowed to cover children in families up to 200 percent of the poverty 
line, but they could extend those income limits even further, depending upon the income 
thresholds in their existing Medicaid programs.  This provision generates some variability in 
income eligibility limits across states, although the range is very narrow for most states. 
  Table 1 details the variation in the implementation and provisions of Medicaid 
expansions, including SCHIP programs, across states around the time that SCHIP was 
introduced.  In most states, children lost coverage at age 14 in 1997 and at age 19 in 1999.  There 
is some variation in the income eligibility limits for SCHIP across states, with limits ranging 
from 100 to 300 percent of the federal poverty line; however, the majority of states ultimately 
used an eligibility limit of 200 percent of the poverty line.   
BBA 97 intentionally allowed states to incorporate features intended to minimize crowd-
out into their SCHIP programs.  For example, states are permitted to impose waiting periods 
before enrollment in SCHIP and most states have chosen to do so (cf. Gruber and Simon, 2008).  
In addition, states are permitted to charge premiums and copayments for services, so long as total 
out-of-pocket costs (including premium) do not exceed 5 percent of family income.  These 
features may be expected to reduce both take-up and crowd-out relative to rates that were 
observed in prior Medicaid expansions. 6 
Like Medicaid coverage, private coverage through a parent’s policy has traditionally 
ended on a child 19
th birthday (or, for full-time students, the child’s 24
th birthday).  Indeed, 
Anderson and Dobkin (2009) document a substantial discontinuity in private insurance coverage 
at exact age 19.  These age limits for parent insurance coverage reflect the tax code, which 
specifies that the tax exclusion for health insurance includes coverage of a dependent child until 
the 19
th (or 24
th) birthday (Internal Revenue Service, 2008).  While, in principle, an employer 
could have extended coverage to older children, the potentially complicated tax implications 
would have provided a very strong disincentive.  Extended parental coverage laws have 
mandated that, in spite of the tax implications, certain firms must extend coverage to young adult 
children. 
Virtually all extended parental coverage laws have been implemented by individual states 
over the past five years.  While there have been proposals to extend parental coverage at the 
federal level, all of the laws to date have been implemented by states.  The first such law was 
implemented in Utah in 1994 where young Mormon adults were losing health insurance while 
carrying out their traditional two years of missionary work (Associated Press, 2007).  Members 
of the Church of Latter-Day Saints applied pressure to the state legislature and a policy allowing 
parents to cover these young adults was implemented.  Kriss, et al. (2008) provides an extensive 
description of the laws introduced through 2007, most of which were implemented in the few 
years preceding that date.   
Table 2 summarizes these extended parental coverage laws.  The table includes the years 
when extended parental coverage laws were implemented, the limiting age of dependency status 
(coverage expires at that birthday), as well as whether the young adult must be a student, must be 
unmarried, or cannot have their own dependents.  The limiting age of dependency status, or age 
up to which young adults are covered, is 25 in the majority of states that passed such laws, with a 7 
few states opting for age 24, 26 or 30. Nearly all states require young adults to be unmarried to 
qualify. While most states allow non-students to qualify under extended parental coverage laws, 
a minority require the young adult to be enrolled in school.
2 A few states require the young adult 
not to have any dependents of their own. As of the end of 2008, 25 states havd implemented 
laws.
3  
Eligibility for extended parental coverage depends not only on the characteristics of the 
adult child, but also on the characteristics of the parents’ insurance coverage.  Naturally, parents 
who do not have private insurance coverage for themselves will not be able to extend coverage to 
their adult children.  In addition, roughly 55 percent of those parents who have employer-
provided health insurance are covered by firms that self-insure (Pierron and Fronstin, 2008).  
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Acts of 1974 (ERISA), self-insured firms are 
exempt from state-level health insurance regulation.  The implication for extended parental 
coverage laws is that a substantial fraction of parents who have employer-provided health 
insurance do not have the option to extend it to their adult children under existing laws.  We use 
this variation in some of our empirical specifications below. 
B. Prior Literature 
Although the decision to remain uninsured may be rational if young adults are risk 
neutral, there are reasons to believe that some form of market failure may also be at play here.  
Levy (2007) analyzes several reasons underlying the low and declining insurance rates among 
young adults.  First, increasingly unstable employment patterns in this population, including 
                                                 
2 Providing health insurance to students up until their 24
th birthday is a nontaxable benefit even without these laws, 
but employers do not need to offer it.  States that require school enrollment for extended parental coverall are 
expanding coverage by mandating the provision of this benefit as well as extending the age at which it is offered.  In 
all of our empirical results presented below, we include these states as having an extended parental coverage law 
despite its potentially limited effect.  We have also experimented with dropping these states and our results were 
virtually unchanged. 
 
3 See the notes to Table 2 for sources. 8 
frequent job changes and employment in part-time and temporary positions, diminish the 
likelihood of employer-sponsored health insurance coverage.  Levy (2007) reports empirical 
evidence that suggests that employment patterns among young adults contribute substantially to 
their low and declining insurance rates.  Second, adverse selection, which has been widely 
documented in health insurance markets (cf. Cutler & Reber, 1998), implies actuarially unfair 
premiums for young adults in both group and non-group insurance markets and therefore lower 
insurance rates.  Increasing health care costs have likely exacerbated this actuarial unfairness for 
healthy, young adults.  Both of these potential explanations for falling insurance rates imply a 
potential role for the government.  Even if the decision were rational for individual young adults, 
one could still argue that the government should intervene in this market if young adults’ failure 
to purchase insurance generates negative externalities on others.  For instance, Gross (2008) 
finds that young adults overuse expensive emergency room care because they lack health 
insurance and those costs may be transferred to others.  
  Prior public interventions into insurance markets through Medicaid expansions have been 
studied extensively.  However, that literature provides many conflicting estimates of take-up and 
crowd-out.  For example, Cutler and Gruber (1996) identify the effects of Medicaid expansions, 
using a measure of “simulated eligibility” that quantifies the legislative variation across states 
and years.  They find crowd-out rates of 30 to 50 percent.  Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005), 
however, suggest that these results are sensitive to specification and choice of data set.  Other 
papers, using longitudinal data sets, have found lower, but non-zero, crowd-out rates (Yazici and 
Kaestner, 2000; Thorpe and Florence, 1999; Blumberg Dubay, and Norton, 2000).  Moreover, 
Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) use a regression discontinuity design to analyze expansions of 
Medicaid that affects those under 100 percent and 133 percent of the poverty line and find that 9 
the coverage effect is low because take-up is low rather than because of large crowd out.  On 
balance, the evidence on crowd-out in Medicaid expansions is quite mixed.   
The more recent literature on SCHIP has also relied primarily on variation in program 
generosity across states and years to identify the effect on insurance coverage.  Using this 
variation, LoSasso and Buchmueller (2004), for example, conclude that 9 percent of eligible 
children gained public insurance coverage, but that crowd-out was nearly 50 percent.  Similarly, 
Gruber & Simon (2008) use the SIPP and find take-up rates ranging from 5 to 15 percent 
depending on the specification; their central crowd-out estimate is 60 percent, although the 
estimates that are most closely related to the results presented in the current paper are in the 20 to 
40 percent range. 
Our contribution, relative to this body of previous literature, is an entirely new 
identification strategy, which relies on the discontinuity in eligibility at age 19, to identify the 
impact of public insurance on coverage rates and crowd out.
4  Because our identification strategy 
is so simple, we are able to show the basis for many of our results in graphs.  In addition, our 
evidence focuses on the marginal older teenager (aged 16-18) who is induced to participate in 
public insurance due to the introduction of SCHIP rather than the marginal child (aged 0-18) 
who is induced to participate, as in the prior literature.  Therefore, our findings are more relevant 
for thinking about the likely effects of expanding SCHIP coverage to older ages.   
The literature on parental extended coverage laws is much less developed because the 
laws have been introduced so recently.  To our knowledge, this paper is the first to address the 
impact of these laws on the level of insurance coverage. 
 
                                                 
4 Gross (2008) and Anderson and Dobkin (2009) also use the discontinuity of SCHIP eligibility at exact age 19 to 
identify the impact of insurance coverage on the use of emergency rooms, outpatient and inpatient services. 10 
III. DATA 
For our analysis, we use several years of data from the March Current Population Survey 
(CPS).  The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households (although the sample size 
varies somewhat over time) conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Each month, 
information about employment status and demographic characteristics is obtained from 
individuals aged 16 and older. The March supplement to the CPS asks additional questions 
including whether individuals had private health insurance, public health insurance, or were 
uninsured (in more recent years) in the preceding calendar year.  
Our analysis of SCHIP uses these data between the years 1992 and 2008, whereas our 
analysis of extended parental coverage laws uses the data between 2000 and 2008.  These 
datasets provide reports of insurance coverage in 1991 to 2007 and 1999 to 2007, respectively.  
We use different sample windows for these exercises to focus more closely on the periods in 
which the laws changed.   
  Several potential concerns must be addressed when using the CPS health insurance 
variables.  First, the CPS was re-designed in 1995, which led to some changes in the reporting of 
health insurance.  This change should not contaminate our analysis, however, as long as the 
reporting changes did not vary discretely with age, which seems unlikely.
5  Second, there is a 
long-standing concern that CPS respondents may actually provide their current insurance status 
when asked about their insurance status in the prior year; thus, health insurance variables are 
potentially measured with error (Swartz, 1986). The quasi-experimental nature of our 
identification strategy, however, is unlikely to be seriously affected by this problem.  All pre- 
and post-policy change years are grouped together so these errors are likely to generate only a 
relatively small number of miscodings.  In addition, the recent literature on SCHIP has raised the 
                                                 
5 We have verified that the results of our analysis are not sensitive to excluding the data collected prior to 1995.   11 
concern that, as states outsource their public insurance plans to HMOs, some individuals who are 
actually on state Medicaid and SCHIP programs may incorrectly report that they are on non-
group private health insurance.  Such incorrect reporting could bias downwards estimates of both 
take-up and crowd-out.  Indeed, Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004) find that their results are 
sensitive to the treatment of reported non-group private insurance coverage.  We will also 
examine the sensitivity of our results to this issue. 
Finally, the literature on Medicaid and SCHIP has raised questions about how to code 
individuals who report both public and private health insurance coverage in the prior year.  If 
these individuals were on private health insurance at the beginning of the year and dropped it in 
order to take up public insurance, then coding them as being on both types of insurance coverage 
would bias downwards estimates of crowd-out.  Gruber and Simon (2008) explored this issue 
using panel data in the SIPP and found that 40 percent of the children who reported both public 
and private insurance in the middle wave also reported overlapping public and private coverage 
before and after the middle wave.  This finding suggests that it is, in many cases, appropriate to 
code these individuals as holding both private and public insurance.  Nonetheless, we explore the 
sensitivity of our estimates to this concern below.   
To capture the nature of the data available to us, we present Figure 2, which displays the 
age pattern of health insurance status over the 2000 to 2007 period.  This figure is comparable to 
figures reported by Levy (2007).  It shows that the majority of teens are covered by a parent’s 
health insurance plan through age 18 and then parental coverage drops off sharply through the 
early 20s.  Coverage from a public plan through age 18 captures a substantial share of those 
without parental coverage, but that drops off as well soon after that.  Own private coverage, 
which includes spousal coverage, makes up a lot of the lost coverage through the late teens and 
early 20s, but not enough to prevent a sizeable drop-off in insurance coverage. Rates of coverage 12 
by any insurance rebound in the middle 20s, but even by age 35 do not reach the level of 
childhood coverage.  Insurance coverage status measures for each individual in the relevant CPS 
surveys provide the dependent variable in our subsequent econometric analyses. 
 
IV.  THE IMPACT OF SCHIP 
A. Identification Strategy 
  Our empirical strategy for identifying the effect of SCHIP on older teenagers relies on the 
age discontinuity in eligibility.  As discussed earlier and shown in Table 1, the introduction of 
SCHIP created a discrete discontinuity in eligibility at age 19 that did not exist prior to BBA 97.  
There are, of course, other sources of variation in eligibility for SCHIP that have been exploited 
by other authors, such as differences in income eligibility limits by state and differences in the 
timing of SCHIP implementation by state.  However, the variation across states was relatively 
small, with the vast majority of states choosing income eligibility cut-offs that were precisely, or 
very close to, 200 percent of the poverty line and most states implementing their SCHIP 
programs by the end of 1998.  In comparison, the variation in SCHIP eligibility across different 
young adult age groups was quite dramatic.  Therefore, our analysis asks whether there is any 
discontinuous change in insurance coverage for individuals under the age of 19 after BBA 97.  
B. Descriptive Analysis 
An advantage of this identification strategy is that any effects should be apparent in a 
simple, graphical analysis.  Indeed, Figure 3A provides suggestive evidence that an age 
discontinuity in insurance coverage emerged after BBA 97.  The figure shows the age pattern of 
insurance coverage in three different time periods: 1990-1995 (before SCHIP), 1999-2003 
(immediately after SCHIP), and 2004-2007 (several years after SCHIP). At most ages, the profile 
of insurance coverage falls relatively uniformly over time.  The exception to this pattern is an 13 
increase in insurance coverage for individuals under 19 years of age in the post-SCHIP periods 
relative to the pre-SCHIP time period.  This suggests that the introduction of SCHIP generated a 
substantive increase in insurance coverage for older teenagers. 
  Public insurance coverage displays a similar pattern, as shown in Figure 3B.  The age 
profile of coverage shows that the percentage of individuals covered by public insurance fell 
over time at most ages with the notable exception of 16-18-year-olds, who experience a relative 
increase in public insurance coverage in the post-SCHIP periods.  Figure 3C provides the same 
graphical analysis for private insurance coverage.  If crowd-out were a substantial issue for this 
age group, we would expect to see a relative decline in private insurance coverage for 16-18-
year-olds after SCHIP was introduced.  Interestingly, this figure suggests that there was, if 
anything, an increase in private insurance coverage.  This figure provides suggestive evidence 
that the magnitude of crowd-out in this age group is unlikely to be large. 
C. Econometric Specification 
Our regression analysis formalizes this graphical analysis, using the following 
framework: 
 (1)   Insuranceiast =α + βBelow19a ⋅Post1998t +δa +τt +πs + ρUnempst + Xiastθ +εiast   
where Insuranceiast is a measure of insurance status for individual i in age group a, state s and 
year t.  Our independent variable of interest is an indicator for being under the age of 19 after 
1998.
 6  The regression includes a full set of age, year, and state fixed effects.  In addition, we 
control for differences in economic conditions across states, using the state- and year-specific 
                                                 
6 In our analysis, we assume that the age reported in the March CPS corresponds to the individual’s age in the prior 
year, the year for which health insurance variables are reported.  However, we have confirmed that our results are 
not sensitive to excluding 19-year-olds—who might plausibly have been below 19 and therefore in the treatment 
group, rather than the control group, during the prior year. 14 
unemployment rate.
7 We also control for individual-level covariates, including gender, marital 
status, student status, household income as a share of the poverty line, and the square of 
household income as a share of the poverty line. We use OLS to estimate the regressions and 
cluster our standard errors at the state level.  We limit the sample to ages 16 to 22, so we are 
including only three years above and below the age cut-off. The implicit identifying assumption 
of our regression is that, in the absence of SCHIP, there would not have been differential trends 
in insurance coverage at ages around the age 19 eligibility limit.   
D. Results 
Table 3 shows our main results for SCHIP.  Column 1 in this table displays the 
percentage of individuals in the relevant population subgroup that is covered by any form of 
insurance.  This is a useful metric for gauging the magnitude of the estimated effects reported in 
the remainder of the Table.  Each cell in Columns 2 through 4 reports the results from a different 
regression; the reported coefficient reflects the estimated value of β from equation (1), which is 
the coefficient on an indicator for being under the age of 19 after 1998.  Each column shows 
coefficients and standard errors for a different dependent variable, and the rows show results for 
different subsamples.   
The first row of Table 3 shows results for the full sample of 16 to 22 year olds.  Our 
results suggest a statistically significant 3.0 percentage point increase in insurance coverage for 
older teenagers associated with the introduction of SCHIP (Column 2).  The third column shows 
a larger, statistically significant 4.2 percentage point increase in public insurance and the fourth 
column shows a statistically insignificant 0.4 percentage point decrease in private insurance 
                                                 
7 Results are similar when we also include state-specific linear trends in our econometric specification. 15 
coverage.
8  The implied level of crowd-out is 10 percent (.004/.042), although this estimate is not 
significantly different from zero.  
The lower rows of Table 3 explore heterogeneity in the effect of SCHIP by income 
category.  Because we prefer a measure of household income that does not reflect the 
temporarily low incomes for otherwise middle- and high-income young adults who are 
transitioning into the labor market, we restrict this analysis to young adults who live with their 
parents.  Therefore, the second row replicates our main results for the full sample of 16 to 22 
year olds who live with their parents; the increase in insurance coverage is somewhat smaller 
than the results in the full sample, but the difference is small and not statistically significant. 
For the lowest income group, with household incomes below 150 percent of the poverty 
line, we see a substantial, 6.7 percentage point increase in insurance coverage.  Prior to SCHIP, 
64 percent of this group was covered by insurance, so 36 percent remained uninsured.  This 
estimated impact of SCHIP suggests that it reduced uninsurance rates by 19 percent.  Estimates 
of crowd-out in this lowest income category are small.  The 8.5 percentage point increase in 
public insurance is accompanied by a statistically insignificant 0.5 percentage point decline in 
private insurance coverage, suggesting a 6 percent crowd-out rate.   
For the middle income group, with household incomes between 150 percent and 300 
percent of the poverty line, take-up rates are lower, which is not surprising, and the overall 
increase in insurance coverage is smaller (a 4.2 percentage point increase, relative to a pre-policy 
uninsurance rate of 19 percent).  Crowd-out for this income group is wrong-signed and 
statistically insignificant.  For the highest income group, with household incomes above 300 
                                                 
8 The coefficients from the public and private insurance models would sum to that for the any insurance model, if 
the two forms of insurance were mutually exclusive.  The nature of the questions asked in the CPS, however, makes 
it possible for a respondent to report both types of coverage in the past year.  We discuss this issue in more detail 
below.  
 16 
percent of the poverty line, we expect little impact of the introduction of SCHIP, because very 
few states extended eligibility to teenagers in this part of the income distribution.  Indeed, there 
are no statistically significant changes in insurance coverage in this income group, and all 
coefficients are very small.   
In Table 4, we examine the time pattern of the change in insurance coverage patterns for 
individuals under the age of 19, to ensure that it corresponds to the timing of SCHIP 
implementation.  For this section of the analysis, we use six separate independent variables of 
interest, which interact the dummy variable for being under the age of 19 with dummies for 
different time periods.  The omitted time period is 1997, the year before changes in insurance 
coverage should have begun, so all coefficients are measured relative to 1997.  Each column of 
the table reports the six key coefficients from a different regression.   
The coefficients in the first two rows show that the difference in insurance coverage for 
those under the age of 19, compared to those over the age of 19, were not statistically different in 
the years leading up to the SCHIP legislation than it was in 1997; these coefficients provide 
evidence that our estimates are unlikely to be merely capturing pre-existing differential trends in 
insurance coverage for those under the age of 19.  The third coefficient shows the change in 
insurance coverage for those under the age of 19 during the transition years, 1998 and 1999, 
when most SCHIP plans were being implemented.  During this time period, we see no 
statistically significant difference in overall insurance coverage, although the second column 
does provide evidence of a small, statistically significant increase in public insurance coverage. 
Beginning in 2000, the regression shows a substantial and statistically significant increase in 
both public insurance coverage and overall insurance coverage.  This rise in insurance coverage 
increases somewhat over time, which is consistent with overall SCHIP enrollment patterns, 
which nearly doubled between 2000 and 2007 (Smith et al., 2008).  Our estimates for private 17 
insurance coverage, reported in the third column, provide only statistically insignificant evidence 
of crowd-out, with point estimates that never exceed a 15 percent crowd-out rate.  
E. Alternative Measures of Crowd-Out 
The prior literature on crowd-out suggests two alternative ways to measures insurance 
status, which could potentially increase our estimate of crowd-out.  One alternative is to consider 
any increase in non-group private insurance to be an increase in public insurance coverage.  This 
alternative measure of public insurance addresses the concern that CPS respondents who are on 
SCHIP programs might erroneously report that they had private insurance coverage. Crowd-out, 
in this case, should be measured as the reduction in group insurance coverage, as a percentage of 
the increase in public and non-group insurance coverage. When we follow this approach, our 
estimates of crowd-out rise.  Specifically, we find a 5.3 percentage point increase in public plus 
non-group insurance, and an insignificant 1.5 percentage point decline in group insurance 
coverage, for an overall crowd-out rate of 28 percent.  However, crowd-out among the lowest 
income group – those with household incomes below 150 percent of the poverty line – remain 
low at only 10 percent. 
Another alternative approach is to measure crowd-out as the reduction in reporting only 
private insurance coverage, as a percentage of the increase in public insurance coverage.  This 
approach addresses the concern that individuals who are in the process of switching from private 
to public health insurance coverage may report both types of coverage.  This approach is the 
most conservative possible solution to this problem, because it assumes that all individuals who 
report overlapping public and private coverage are being crowded out.  As mentioned above, 
Gruber & Simon’s (2008) investigation of this issue in the SIPP suggests that this approach is 
likely too conservative, since roughly half of the individuals who report having both public and 
private insurance continue to do so in later interviews. Nonetheless, we used this approach and 18 
found a statistically significant decline in private insurance coverage, resulting in an overall 
crowd-out rate of 29 percent.  Among the lowest income groups, the crowd-out rate is 21 percent 
and remains statistically insignificant.  We consider these estimates to be upper bounds on 
crowd-out among older teenagers due to SCHIP expansions.   
While our estimates of crowd-out are lower than those in the prior literature, we do not 
believe that they are necessarily inconsistent with the prior literature. Our identification strategy 
relies on a marginal SCHIP participant who is a 16- to 18-year-old who was made eligible for 
public insurance by SCHIP’s expansion of the age eligibility limit.  In contrast, the identification 
strategy in Gruber and Simon (2008) and Lo Sasso and Buchmueller (2004) relies on differences 
in SCHIP eligibility across all age groups and states.  Their strategy, therefore, relies on a 
marginal SCHIP participant who is likely to be much younger and with higher income. For 
example, prior to the introduction of SCHIP, the minimum income eligibility limit for 1-5-year-
olds was 133 percent of the federal poverty line, whereas the typical 18-year-old had to meet the 
dramatically lower AFDC eligibility rules.  So, if higher income individuals have lower take-up 
rates and higher crowd-out rates, it may not be surprising that our analysis estimates lower 
crowd-out.   However, for the purposes of predicting crowd-out rates for further expansions of 
public insurance to older age groups – including recent proposals to expand SCHIP eligibility to 
adults in their early 20s – our lower estimates of crowd-out in SCHIP are likely more relevant 
than estimates from the prior literature. 
 
V.  THE IMPACT OF EXTENDED PARENTAL COVERAGE LAWS 
A. Identification Strategy and Econometric Specification 
The second portion of our analysis focuses on the impact of extended parental coverage 
laws.  As shown in Table 2, there is substantial variation across states in the implementation of 19 
these laws. Our basic identification relies on standard quasi-experimental variation comparing 
changes in outcomes in states that adopt laws before and after their implementation relative to 
changes in outcomes over time in states that did not introduce these laws.  In addition, since the 
provisions of these laws in states that adopted them made certain population subgroups eligible 
and others ineligible, we also adopt triple-difference estimation strategies that provide even 
stronger methods of drawing causal conclusions. 
Our basic regression framework is as follows: 
(2)   Insuranceiast =α + βLaws ⋅Postt +δa +τt +πs + ρUnempst + Xiastθ +εiast   
where Insuranceiast is a measure of insurance status for individual i in age group a, state s and 
year t.  Our independent variable of interest is an indicator for living in a state that has adopted 
an extended parental coverage law in a year after the law was implemented.  As in the SCHIP 
analysis, the regressions include a full set of age, year, and state fixed effects.  We again control 
for differences in state-specific economic shocks using the state- and year-specific 
unemployment rate, and we control for individual-level covariates, including gender, marital 
status, student status, household income as a share of the poverty line, and the square of 
household income as a share of the poverty line. We continue to use OLS to estimate the 
regressions and cluster our standard errors at the state level.   
To begin our analysis, we use a sample of all young adults between the ages of 19 and 24, 
the age group that would be affected by laws, to estimate the aggregate impact of the law using 
standard difference-in-difference methods.
9  We then separate that sample into population 
subgroups that we would expect to be more and less affected by its introduction.  Initially, we 
restrict the sample to include just those who meet the eligibility criteria in their state.  For states 
                                                 
9 We exclude all data from Massachusetts in this analysis, because of the broader health insurance reform that was 
implemented at the same time as the extended parental coverage law. 20 
that have not passed extended parental coverage laws and therefore have not established 
eligibility criteria, we assume that the only eligibility criterion is that the young adult must be 
unmarried.  As an additional test, we run a triple-difference specification that uses the ineligible 
young adults in the states as the third difference.  This approach uses the ineligibles within the 
states as an additional control group that can adjust for other within-state differences that may be 
affecting levels of health insurance coverage in the state.  We continue our analysis by further 
separating the sample into narrower population subgroups, who we might expect to be more and 
less likely to be affected by extended parental coverage laws.   
B. Results 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results of our analysis.  As in Table 3, the first column of these 
tables displays the percentage of individuals in the relevant population subgroups who are 
covered by any form of insurance.  In Columns 2 through 4 of both tables, every cell represents 
the results from a different regression.  Different dependent variables are shown in different 
columns, and different samples and specifications are shown in different rows.   
The first row of Table 5 shows the difference-in-difference results for the full sample.  
We do not find that extended parental coverage laws are associated with a statistically significant 
increase in insurance coverage overall or private insurance coverage in this model.  In the second 
row, we focus more narrowly on those young adults who would be eligible for this form of 
coverage.  Perhaps not surprisingly, we see larger effects for this group; private insurance 
coverage is estimated to increase by a statistically significant 1.9 percentage points.  The 
magnitude of the effect on private insurance coverage is larger in the triple-difference 
specification in the third row, at 3.8 percentage points.  
Interestingly, the net effect on overall insurance coverage in both specifications is muted 
by an offsetting decline in public insurance coverage, which is statistically significant in the 21 
difference-in-difference specification.  This finding suggests the possibility of “reverse crowd-
out” resulting from extended parental coverage laws.  When young adults are able to move onto 
their parents’ private insurance plans, some of them appear to drop public insurance to do so.  
This reverse crowd-out might be expected to occur if the private insurance plan provides more 
generous coverage or better access to providers.
10 
In the second panel of Table 5, we restrict our analysis to individuals who are not 
students.  Since the tax incentive for employer-provided health insurance has traditionally 
extended to students up to the age of 24, the impact of extended parental coverage laws should 
be much smaller for students than for non-students.  In the bottom of Table 5 we show results for 
non-students who should be more strongly affected.
11  These results show that, indeed, increases 
in private insurance coverage associated with extended parental coverage laws are concentrated 
among non-students.  The triple difference estimate for the sample of non-students indicates that 
these laws increased private insurance coverage by 5.6 percent, compared to 3.8 percent for the 
full sample.  However, Panel B also shows that the decreases in public insurance coverage are 
not statistically significant.  Although the additional evidence that is presented below is 
uniformly consistent with reverse crowd-out, the findings in Panel B of Table 5 lead us to 
consider our overall evidence for reverse crowd-out to be suggestive, rather than conclusive.   
Table 6 reports the results of additional difference-in-difference models by more 
narrowly defined population subgroups. To identify these subgroups, we need identifying 
information in the data that is only available on the parents’ record, so we are required to restrict 
                                                 
10 We conducted one additional test to validate the notion of reverse crowd-out.  Among those in their early 20s, 
public insurance coverage largely results from welfare receipt and most welfare recipients are female.  As an 
additional test, we estimate these models separately by gender.  The results indicate that reverse crowd-out is largely 
attributable to women, as we might suspect. 
 
11 We do not show results for students, because there are so very few ineligible students that our triple-difference 
empirical strategy is far less compelling for this subsample 22 
the population to those respondents living with their parents.  Because the main reason a young 
adult would be ineligible for extended parental coverage is marriage and few married young 
adults live with their parents, the triple-difference estimating strategy does not make sense in this 
context.  In this part of the analysis, we restrict our attention to difference-in-difference models 
relying just on those eligible for extended parental coverage, as described earlier.  The first row 
of this table reports the results of estimates comparable to the second row of Table 5 (eligible 
sample) except that it focuses on just those young adults living with their parents.  As described 
earlier, we impose this sample restriction so that we can observe relevant household 
characteristics that enable us to better identify who may be affected by these laws.  The results 
from this specification are similar to those in Table 5. 
The next rows of the table show effects by income category.  These laws clearly affect a 
different income group than SCHIP introduction does.  Increases in private insurance are 
statistically insignificant for young adults in households with incomes below 150 percent of the 
poverty line.  This finding is not surprising, since the parents in these households are unlikely to 
have private health insurance to extend to their adult children.  The impact of the extended 
parental coverage – in terms of an increase in private insurance coverage and a decrease in public 
insurance coverage – is concentrated almost entirely among the group with incomes between 150 
and 300 percent of the poverty line.  For this group, extended parental coverage laws are 
associated with a 6.4 percentage point increase in private insurance coverage, a 2.4 percentage 
point decrease in public insurance coverage, and a 2.7 percentage point increase in overall 
insurance coverage.  This 2.7 percentage point increase in insurance coverage is relative to a pre-
policy uninsurance rate of 33 percent, so it represents an 8 percent decline in the prevalence of 
uninsurance in this income group.  Interestingly, there is not a statistically significant increase in 
insurance coverage for those with incomes over 300 percent of the poverty line.  In the pre-23 
policy period, though, 85 percent of these young adults had private insurance, so there was less 
scope for expanding insurance coverage in this income group than in the lower income groups. 
In the bottom rows of Table 6, we examine heterogeneity in the effects by parents’ 
insurance coverage.  We expect the impact of extended parental coverage laws to be strongly 
concentrated among the children of parents who are covered by group health insurance plans.  
Although some states included non-group insurance policies in their extended parental coverage 
laws, most focused on group health insurance policies.  Moreover, since group health insurance 
policies are typically much less expensive than non-group health insurance policies, young adults 
who become eligible for extended parental coverage have a much stronger incentive to take 
advantage of it if their parents have group insurance.  In fact, we see that the effects of the 
extended parental coverage laws – including increases in private insurance and decreases in 
public insurance – are concentrated among those whose parents have group insurance coverage. 
In addition, among children whose parents have group health insurance, we expect the 
effects of extended parental coverage laws to be strongest for those whose parents work for 
relatively small firms.  This prediction arises from the ERISA legislation of 1974, which exempts 
the insurance policies of self-insured firms from state regulation.  As a result, roughly half of 
those who have employer-provided health insurance have insurance policies that are not affected 
by these legal changes.
12  In the absence of ERISA’s effects, this prediction would likely be 
reversed, since small employers face higher expected premiums and therefore are less likely to 
offer health insurance (cf. Ellis and Ma, 2009).  While we cannot observe in the CPS which 
parents work in self-insured firms, we do know that the probability of self-insurance increases 
dramatically with firm size:  In firms with less than 200 employees, only 12 percent of 
                                                 
12 According to the 2008 Kaiser/Health Research and Education Trust (HRET) Employer Heath Benefits Survey, 
55% of workers who receive health insurance through their employer are in self-funded insurance plans. 24 
employees were in self-funded plans; in contrast, 89 percent of employees of firms that have 
5,000 or more employees are in self-funded plans (Henry J. Kaiser Foundation and HRET,   
2008).   
We take advantage of this fact and use firm size as a proxy for self-insurance status.  We 
create two further sub-samples among the children of parents with group insurance coverage: 
those whose parents work for firms with less than 100 employees and those whose parents work 
for firms with more than 100 employees.
13  We expect to find larger effects in the smaller firms, 
because these smaller firms are substantially more likely to be required to follow the state 
insurance law.   
Indeed, we find our largest increase in private insurance coverage in the group of children 
whose parents have group insurance coverage through a firm with fewer than 100 employees.  
For this group, we find that private insurance coverage increases by a statistically significant 6.7 
percentage points, compared to a 1.5 percentage point increase in private insurance coverage 
among those whose parents work for larger firms.
14  The 4.9 percentage point increase in overall 
insurance coverage for this group is substantial, particularly when compared to the pre-policy 
uninsurance rate of 19.5 percent for this particular population.  We also continue to find evidence 
of reverse crowd-out.  The decline in public insurance coverage is considerably larger for 
children of parents who work in small firms, as we would expect if it was caused by the extended 
parental coverage laws. 
This set of findings has two important implications:  First, it provides some validation of 
our empirical strategy, by showing that the overall effects that we estimate are driven by the sub-
                                                 
13 We also experimented with alternative firm size cut-offs (like 500 employees) and obtained qualitatively similar 
results. 
14 We also find that, for those whose parents are included in a group plan, there is a decrease in nongroup coverage 
and an increase in group coverage.  Individuals who used to pay for their own individual plans appear to drop them 
and join their parents’ plan.  This transition likely saves money for these individuals and potentially provides them 
with superior insurance. 25 
sample that should be most strongly affected by extended parental coverage laws.  Second, it 
provides some explanation for the relatively small overall effects of extended parental coverage 
laws.  Even if a young adult is legally eligible for a state-level extended parental coverage law, 
he or she can only take advantage of that eligibility if his or her parent has group insurance 
coverage through a firm that does not self-insure.  Among those who are both legally eligible and 
have parents who are able to extend coverage, the take-up rates – and the corresponding 
reductions in uninsurance – are quite high. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
  The results of our analysis suggest that both the introduction of SCHIP and extended 
parental coverage laws were effective in increasing rates of insurance coverage for older teens 
and young adults, at least for certain population subgroups.  SCHIP was particularly effective at 
increasing insurance coverage for older teens who were under 150 percent of the poverty line 
without evidence of substantial crowd-out.  Extended parental coverage laws had a sizeable 
impact on the insurance coverage of non-students, young adults between 150 and 300 percent of 
the poverty line and those whose parents worked for relatively small firms that had group 
insurance plans.  We also found suggestive evidence that the increase in insurance coverage that 
this policy generated may have been accompanied by a reduction in public insurance coverage 
(reverse crowd-out).  The magnitude of the coverage effects is somewhat larger in response to 
the introduction of SCHIP than the introduction of extended parental coverage laws, but both led 
to meaningful increases in coverage for their target populations. 
  Determining whether policymakers should endorse extending either or both of these 
programs requires a weighing of their advantages and disadvantages as implemented in the past 
and as they would be extended going forward.  In the case of SCHIP, for instance, our policy 26 
experiment addressed the discontinuity of coverage at age 19 created when SCHIP was 
introduced.  An expansion of this policy could increase the maximum age of coverage to, say 22 
or 25.  It is not clear whether or not the impact of such an extension would be the same as that of 
the earlier policy.  
  One issue to consider would be differences in crowd-out.  If anything, our prior would be 
that crowd-out would be smaller for this group than it is for younger children and, in fact, our 
estimates of crowd-out based on the introduction of SCHIP were smaller than those from earlier 
Medicaid expansions.  We hypothesize that the reason for this is that the marginal “child” 
gaining coverage in SCHIP is a teen who is lower in the income distribution than the younger 
children who gained coverage in earlier Medicaid expansions.  Uninsured young adults would 
similarly be more likely to be drawn from the lower parts of the income distribution and, if our 
hypothesis is correct, crowd-out may be less important for this group. 
  Another factor that may suggest even larger effects for young adults is that they have 
fewer options for coverage.  Young children have the ability to be included in their parents’ plan 
if their parents are covered; parental coverage is quite high for younger children as shown in 
Figure 2.  Young adults would have to rely on their own private coverage as their alternative to a 
public plan, yet private coverage rates are relatively low for young adults (also shown in Figure 
2). 
  To provide a ballpark estimate of the number of additional young adults who may be 
covered if SCHIP was extended to cover individuals up to their 22
nd or 25
th birthday, we ignore 
these caveats for the moment.  We assume that the impact on the incremental groups covered is 
the same as we have estimated for those at age 19 with the same extent of crowdout.  Based on 
our results in Table 3, we apply the aggregate estimate that insurance coverage of any type 
would rise by 3 percentage points to simulate this statistic.  We combine this value with 27 
population estimates from the 2005-2007 American Community Surveys indicating that there are 
about 13.3 million individuals between the ages of 19 and 21 and another 12.2 million between 
22 and 24.  If 3 percentage points more members of these groups received health insurance in 
response to an SCHIP expansion, this would increase coverage by 399,000 and 366,000 
individuals, respectively. 
  We also hypothesize that extended parental coverage laws would have larger effects than 
those we have estimated if they are implemented at the federal level.  A key constraint on the 
effectiveness of these laws as currently enacted at the state level is that ERISA significantly 
restricts the target population.  As discussed earlier, 55 percent of those parents who have 
employer-provided health insurance are covered by firms that self-insure and ERISA excludes 
those plans from state regulation.  If implemented at a national level, that restriction would not 
exist.  Moreover, state level plans require children to be residing in the same state as the parents 
and that would not need to be true if the policy were implemented at the federal level. 
  To simulate the effect of a national extended parental coverage law for those ages 19 to 
24, we apply the estimate obtained from parents receiving group insurance from the smaller 
firms that do not self-insure to approximate the impact of a law that was not constrained by 
ERISA.  For that sample, insurance rates rose 5 percentage points.  Without the constraint of 
ERISA, we assume this impact would extend to all of those whose parents held group coverage, 
although this group is only around three-quarters of the population.  Therefore, we apply the 5 
percentage point estimate along with the three-quarters group coverage estimate to the 25.5 
million individuals between the ages of 19 and 24 to get a simulated coverage increase of 
956,000 young adults.  This would include those who have already received coverage as a result 
of the state laws. 28 
  The question of who pays for the insurance coverage is also a relevant issue.  We find 
some support for the notion that extended parental coverage laws generate reverse crowd out in 
that some individuals may drop public insurance coverage for what may be superior private 
insurance coverage.  This shifts the cost of the coverage from the taxpayer to the individual’s 
family and the insurance company.  To the extent that the family pays, such an outcome may be 
optimal.  To the extent that insurance companies are unable to sufficiently assess and spread risk 
in the presence of adverse selection, it may be suboptimal. 
  In the end, policymakers will be required to weigh these trade-offs in determining 
whether to introduce either or both of these policies.  Nevertheless, our analysis has provided 
evidence indicating that both types of policies as implemented have increased insurance 
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1990‐1995 1999‐2003 2004‐2007 
Table 1:  Changes in Income and Age Eligibility Limits Associated with 
Medicaid Expansions and the Introduction of SCHIP 
 
 
Percent of Federal Poverty Line    Upper Age Limit 
State  1995 1997 1999 2001    1995 1997 1999 
 Alabama    100  133  200  200    12  14  19 
  Alaska      100 100 200 200    12  14  19 
 Arizona    100  100  150  200    16  18  19 
  Arkansas  100 100 200 200    12  14  19 
 California    100  100  200  250    12  14  19 
  Colorado      100 100 185 185    12  14  19 
  Connecticut      185 185 300 300    12  14  19 
  Delaware      100 100 200 200    19  19  19 
 District of Columbia   100  100  200  200    12  14  19 
  Florida      100 100 200 200    12  19  19 
 Georgia    100  100  200  200    19  19  19 
  Hawaii  300 300 300 200    19  19  19 
  Idaho      100 100 150 150    12  14  19 
  Illinois      100 100 185 185    12  14  19 
  Indiana      100 100 150 200    12  19  19 
 Iowa    100  100  185  200    12  14  19 
 Kansas    100  100  200  200    12 16 19 
  Kentucky      100 100 100 200    12  19  19 
  Louisiana      100 100 133 200    12  14  19 
 Maine    125  125  185  200    19  19  19 
  Maryland  185 185 200 200    12  14  19 
 Massachusetts   200  100 200 200    12  14  19 
  Michigan      150 150 200 200    16  18  19 
  Minnesota  275 275 275 275    18  18  19 
 Mississippi    100  100  100  200    12  14  19 
  Missouri      100 100 300 300    18  18  19 
  Montana      100 100 100 150    12  14  18 
  Nebraska      100 100 185 185    12  14  19 
 Nevada    100  100  200  200    12  14  19 
 New Hampshire    185  185  300  300    19  19  19 
 New Jersey    100  100  200  350    12  14  19 
 New Mexico    100  185  235  235    12  19  19 
 New York    160  100  230  250    15  14  19 
 North Carolina    100  100  200  200    18  18  19 
 North Dakota    100  100  100  140    12  18  19 
  Ohio      100 100 150 200    12  14  19 
  Oklahoma      100 100 185 185    12  14  18 
  Oregon      100 100 170 170    12  19  19 
 Pennsylvania    185  185  235  235    12  14  19 
  Rhode  Island  100 250 250 250    12  19  19 
 South Carolina    100  100  150  150    12  14  19 
 South Dakota    100  100  140  200    12  19  19 
  Tennessee  100 400 200  200    12 18 19  
 Texas    100  100  100  200    12  14  19 
 Utah    100  100  200  200    18  18  19 
  Vermont  225 225 300 300    18  18  18 
  Virginia      100 100 185 200    19  19  19 
  Washington  200 200 200 250    19  19  19 
 West Virginia    150  150  150  200    19  19  19 
  Wisconsin      100 100 100 185    12  14  19 
 Wyoming    100  100  100  133    12  14  19 
Sources: Shore-Sheppard (2003), Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2004), and National Governors Association 
(various years). 
 
   
 
 
Table 2: Extended Parental Coverage Law Details 
State Name 
Year Law was 
Implemented 
Limiting Age of 
Dependency 






Colorado  2006  25     X    
Delaware 2007  24    X  X 
Florida 2007  25    X   
Idaho 2007  25  X  X   
Indiana 2007  24       
Maine 2007  25    X  X 
Massachusetts 2006  25       
New Hampshire  2007  26    X   
New Jersey  2006  30    X  X 
New Mexico  2005  25    X   
Rhode Island  2007  25  X  X   
South Dakota  2005  24  X     
Texas 2003  25    X   
Utah 1994  26    X   
Virginia 2007  25  X     
Washington 2007 25    X   
West Virginia  2007  25     X    
Notes: Entries in table show whether law was in effect as of December of that year. Age of dependency is birthday at which 
dependency expires. 
Sources: Kronstadt, et al. (2007), Kriss, et al. (2008) National Conference of State Legislatures (2008), and our own reading of 
state laws. 
  
   
 







































By Income:        



























Notes: Each cell in Columns 2-4 presents the results from separate difference-in-difference regressions models. Control variables 
include state, year, and age fixed effects, the state- and year-specific unemployment rate, and individual-level covariates.   
Standard errors are clustered on state. The sample includes all observations between the ages of 16 and 22, using the 1992-2008 
CPS. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
   
Table 4: The Effect of SCHIP on Insurance Coverage 
Dynamic Specification 
  













Under Age 19 






















































Notes: Each column presents the results from separate difference-in-difference regressions models.  The omitted period is 1997.  
Control variables include state, year, and age fixed effects, the state- and year-specific unemployment rate, and individual-level 
covariates.  Standard errors are clustered on state. The sample includes all observations between the ages of 16 and 22, using the 
1992-2008 CPS.  N=270,636. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 




   








































































































Notes: Each cell in Columns 2-4 presents the results from separate difference-in-difference regressions models.  Control 
variables include state, year, and age fixed effects, the state- and year-specific unemployment rate, and individual-level 
covariates.  Standard errors are clustered on state. The sample includes all observations between the ages of 19 and 24, using the 
2000-2008 CPS. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
   
Table 6: The Effect of Extended Parental Coverage Laws on Insurance Coverage  
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    And firm size<100 








    And firm size>100 
















Notes:  Each cell in Columns 2-4 presents the results from separate difference-in-difference regressions models.   Control 
variables include state, year, and age fixed effects, the state- and year-specific unemployment rate, and individual-level 
covariates.  Standard errors are clustered on state. The sample includes observations on all targeted groups between the ages of 19 
and 24, using the 2000-2008 CPS.  All targeted groups are restricted to those who live with their parents and are eligible for 
coverage in treatment states and are unmarried in control states. 
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 